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A SHORT DEFENSE OF SOUTHLAND, CASAROTTO,
AND OTHER LONG-CONTROVERSIAL ARBITRATION
DECISIONS
Stephen J. Ware*
calding criticism of Supreme Court arbitration decisions appeared in the 1990’s and is now widespread. Over twenty years
ago, Jean Sternlight feared Supreme Court arbitration decisions
“placed consumers' and employees' due process, jury-trial, and Article III rights in serious jeopardy.”1 Professor Sternlight similarly
warns nowadays that a 2011 arbitration decision by the Court “will
provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued.”2 Similarly, spanning the decades, 1990’s David Schwartz proclaimed
“The Supreme Court has created a monster” with its “enthusiastic
approval” of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts
as generally enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act

S

* Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Thanks to Imre
Szalai, Chris Drahozal, Jean Sternlight, David Schwartz, Luke Norris, and participants in the 2017 Loyola Consumer Law Review Symposium for comments.
Thanks also to Amanda Feriante, Bridget Brazil, Elliott Brewer, and Ellen Rudolph for research assistance.
1
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme

Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
2
Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704-05 (2012). See also Jean R. Sternlight,
Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Consumer Arbitration
As A Poster Child for Regulation, 48 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343, 357 (2016) (“whereas
millions of financial consumers who are not subject to pre-dispute arbitration
clauses receive benefits through class actions, only a minute portion of consumers covered by arbitration clauses actually choose to bring arbitration claims”).
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(“FAA”). 3 Professor Schwartz continues in this decade to accuse Supreme Court arbitration decisions of “converting the FAA into a
radical claim-suppressing statute.”4
Accomplished scholars like Sternlight and Schwartz are not
the only sources of strong language opposing the Court’s arbitration decisions. A state supreme court justice’s concurring opinion a
generation ago sounded the legal profession’s ultimate alarm—a
“threat to undermine the rule of law”5—about adhesive arbitration
agreements that “in effect, subvert our system of justice as we have
come to know it.” 6 Justice Trieweiler went on to assert that “if any
foreign government tried to do the same, we would surely consider
it a serious act of aggression.” 7 This sort of dramatic rhetoric, even
from normally-circumspect judges, continues over twenty years
later. Under the heading “Forced Arbitration Destroys Individual
Rights,” a 2015 federal court decision declares:
Today, forced arbitration bestrides the legal landscape like a colossus, effectively stamping out the individual’s statutory rights wherever inconvenient to
the businesses which impose them. What is striking is
that, other than the majority of the Supreme Court,
whose questionable jurisprudence erected this legal
monolith, no one thinks they got it right – no one, not
the inferior federal courts, not the state courts, not the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
… not the academic community.8
3

David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 33, 33 (1997).
4
David Schwartz, Symposium, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New
Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2012). See also David S. Schwartz, Justice Scalia's
Jiggery-Pokery in Federal Arbitration Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. Headnotes 75,
78 (2016) (criticizing “a long series of Supreme Court decisions that authorize
claim-suppressing arbitration”).
5
Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939–40 (Mont. 1994).
6
7
8

Id.
Id.

In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 309 F.R.D. 107, 146–47 (D.
Mass. 2015), as amended (Aug. 7, 2015), aff'd, 842 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016). The
quoted opinion is by United States District Court Judge William G. Young, who
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From this alleged consensus of “No one thinks they got it right,” I
dissent in significant part. While I have long opposed Supreme
Court decisions on arbitration law’s separability doctrine9 and judicial review of arbitration awards,10 and would reduce adhesive
arbitration agreements’ impact on class actions,11 I continue to
sympathize with some of the Court’s long-controversial arbitration
decisions.
I choose the word “sympathize” because I believe much of
the criticism of the Court’s arbitration decisions does not sufficiently weigh the difficult position the Court was in when deciding
those cases. The FAA was enacted in the 1920’s before the landmark federalism case of Erie v. Tompkins,12 the New Deal’s expansion of the Commerce Clause and thus of federal power to

was appointed to the bench by President Reagan in 1985. He received an A.B.
from Harvard University in 1962, and a LL.B. from Harvard Law School in
1967. Source: Young, William G., U.S. D. DIST. OF MASS.,
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/young.htm (last visited Sep. 16, 2017).
9
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 128-38, 159-60 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law's
Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV.
L.J. 107, 121 (2007); Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration Law, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1234-48 (2016).
10
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999); Stephen J. Ware, Interstate
Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, EDWARD BRUNET,
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88 (2006); Stephen
J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 56 (2014); Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative)
Arbitration Law, supra note 9, at 1248-60.
11
Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration
Law, supra note 9, at 1259-718.
12
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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preempt state law,13 the growth of federal employment and consumer law in the 1960’s and 1970’s,14 and the ensuing explosion of
class actions.15 Each of these enormous changes to our nation’s legal landscape conflicted, as explained below, with the premises underlying the FAA. While Congress could have amended the FAA
to accommodate and be more consistent with these enormous

13

Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of
the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483-484 (1997) (advocates and opponents agree
“the constitutional transformation of the New Deal era” was “a nationalist revolution,” as the New Deal Court granted “extensive new powers to Congress,”
especially “under the Commerce Clause,” so “the states became constitutionally
dependent on the will of Congress through the latter's power of preemption and
the operation of the Supremacy Clause.”).
14
Spencer Weber Waller et al., Consumer Protection in the United States:
An Overview, 2011 EUR. J. CONSUMER L. 853 (2011) (“[T]he modern consumer
protection movement began in the 1960s with to the promotion of a Consumer
Bill of Rights by President Kennedy, the growth of the so-called ‘Great Society’
program of the Johnson administration, and the efforts of Ralph Nader and
other consumer advocates to highlight the existence of unsafe products and the
need for greater government regulation.”); Terry Carter, Should this toy be
saved?, ABA JOURNAL (May 1, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/should_this_toy_be_saved/ (“The consumer movement largely developed by Ralph Nader in the mid-1960s reached a pinnacle
with the creation of the CPSC in 1972.”); William R. Corbett & Frank L. Maraist,
The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
91, 91–92 (2003) (“In 1960 only two major federal statutory laws regulated employment. … Then, for a thirty-year period beginning in 1963, Congress enacted
a host of employment laws.”).
15
Edward F. Sherman, Decline & Fall, ABA J., June 2007, at 51,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/decline_fall/ (“The rise and fall of
consumer class actions is a cycle that began in 1966 when the scope of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was expanded to allow class action suits
for damages. … [I]n addition to causing consternation in the business sector, the
increase in class actions ignited an intense debate over whether the social benefits of class actions outweigh their costs.”); Douglas Martin, The Law: The Rise
and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, NEW YORK TIMES (January 8, 1988),
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/08/us/the-law-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-classaction-lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all (“[I]n the 1970's, class actions became the
rage of the legal profession. Now they appear to be dying. The surge of class
actions, which allow a large group of 'similarly situated’ plaintiffs to combine
similar claims in a single suit, related to the loosening of rules governing them in
1966. Fees in class actions were high and there seemed no end to what they might
accomplish.”).
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changes, it did not. So, reconciling an old statute with a half century of law in tension with that statute’s premises became the
Court’s task.
These longstanding issues continue to pervade recent arbitration scholarship, including very recent articles by Margaret Moses16 and Luke Norris.17 Like many others,18 Professor Moses argues that the drafters and adopters of the FAA did not intend for
it to preempt state law or to cover consumer and employment arbitration agreements. She writes:
Neither the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act
nor the Congress that adopted it intended for it to
cover consumers or workers, or to displace state jurisdiction or state substantive law. The FAA was
simply intended to provide a means for resolving disputes among commercial entities that might voluntarily choose to forego their rights to have their disputes settled in court, in favor of what they deemed
to be a simpler and more efficient means of dispute
resolution. That point has been lost on the Supreme
Court.19
This argument’s two main parts are that the drafters and adopters
of the FAA did not intend for it to: (1) preempt state law or (2) cover
consumer and employment arbitration agreements. The following
pages address these arguments in turn.
16

Margaret L. Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction of the
FAA Has Affected Consumers, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2017). Moses’
recent piece cites and builds upon her earlier article, Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created A Federal Arbitration
Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006), so both articles are cited herein.
17
Luke P. Norris, The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249 (2018).
18
See infra notes 25 and 51.
19
Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 1. See
also Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 156 (“Despite concerns
expressed by members of the 1925 Congress that arbitration not be imposed in a
“take-it-or-leave-it” context, the Supreme Court since the 1980s has created a
statute which permits businesses to do exactly that.”) (citing Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)).
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I. ERIE’S IMPACT ON FAA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
The United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause says
that if a federal law is within the scope of federal power then it is
supreme over conflicting state law.20 For example, if a defendant
who would be liable under state tort law shows enforcement of that
state law would conflict with a federal statute, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, then the defendant wins
the case.21 While federal substantive law preempts inconsistent
state law, and does so whether the case is heard in federal or state
court,22 federal procedural law does not necessarily preempt state
law.23 For instance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
preempt inconsistent state law because the Federal Rules of Civil
20

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
21
See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210–14 (2004) (“respondents’ state causes of action fall within the scope of ERISA * * * and are
therefore completely pre-empted by ERISA”) (internal quotations omitted); Pilot
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1987).
22
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (“Federal law is enforceable in
state courts * * * because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as
much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy
Clause makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges state
courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure.”); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 1378, 1381 (2015) (“The Supremacy Clause instructs courts to give federal
law priority when state and federal law clash. But it is not the ‘source of any
federal rights’, and certainly does not create a cause of action.”).
23
“No one disputes the general and unassailable proposition * * * that States
may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts.”
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). However, “Federal law takes state
courts as it finds them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.”
Id. at 150 (internal quotations omitted); Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 767
(2009) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause supplies [The Supreme Court] with no authority to pre-empt a state procedural law merely because it ‘burdens the exercise’
of a federal right in state court.”).
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Procedure only apply in federal court and the “inconsistent” state
law, the state rules of civil procedure, only apply in state court. No
conflict arises because each set of rules governs only in its own forum.
The same was true of federal and state arbitration law prior
to the FAA’s 1925 enactment. Federal arbitration law governed
only in federal court, while state arbitration law governed only in
state court.24 The FAA was designed to continue this pattern of federal arbitration law consisting merely of procedural law governing
only in federal courts, according to Professor Moses and most other
scholars. 25 In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Southland Corp.
24

IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 21–24 (1992); IAN R.
MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 10.1 (1994 & Supp.1999).
25
Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 3
(“[the] proposal to Congress was limited – it was for a statute that would apply
only to procedure in the federal courts and would not affect state law.”); Id. at 1
(“Neither the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Congress that
adopted it intended it to cover consumers or workers, or to displace state jurisdiction or state substantive law.”) See also David Horton, Federal Arbitration
Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1219
(2013) (“Most courts and commentators believe that Congress intended the statute to be a mere procedural rule for federal courts. Yet three decades ago, in
Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court held that the FAA applies in state court
and eclipses contrary state law”); Id. at 1227–28 (“Few modern opinions have
weathered as much criticism as Southland. ... Ironically, FAA preemption,
though widely seen as illegitimate, is now well-established.”); IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 92–121 (1992); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing
Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L. J. 239, 252 (2012) (“The other error was
the decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating and its progeny to federalize arbitration law by holding that the FAA preempts state law. The manifold implications
of this decision include making a needlessly complex hash of arbitration law by
interpenetrating federal and state judge-made contract doctrine; creating a jurisdictional anomaly by holding the FAA to be the only “substantive” federal law
that creates no federal question jurisdiction; inhibiting the states’ efforts to prevent misuse of arbitration clauses as loopholes in consumer protection law; and,
of course, flouting the basic federalism principle, unanimously accepted by the
Court in other contexts, that Congress cannot constitutionally make procedural
rules for state courts.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd
Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60
KAN. L. REV. 795, 834–835 (2012) (“the Southland majority may have been excessively intent on expanding the Act and embracing arbitration on personal
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v. Keating,26 that FAA section 2 is substantive federal law governing in both federal and state courts.27 In defense of Southland,
Christopher Drahozal notes that its holding is consistent with the
language of FAA section 2, which “broadly makes ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration
agreements. Nothing in the language of the section limits its application to cases in the federal courts.”28 “By contrast,” he writes, “the
remaining sections of the FAA by their terms apply only in federal
court.”29
Even if the drafters and adopters of the FAA did not intend
for any of it to apply in state court and preempt state law, this original understanding of the FAA would not be conclusive because it
does not account for the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie v.
Tompkins.30 This landmark case held that “federal courts lack the
authority to create ‘federal general common law,’ an authority that
the Supreme Court had endorsed nearly a century earlier,”31 but
rather must “apply state law in the same fashion that a state court
would.”32 Erie is one of the most studied cases ever because of its

preference grounds rather than giving the issue the careful reading of precedent
that it deserved.”); Imre S. Szalai, Directv, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme
Court Used A Jedi Mind Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 75, 88 (2017) (describing Southland as “infamous” and
“one of the biggest errors in the Court's history”).
26
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
27
Id. at 12 (“the Arbitration Act ‘creates a body of federal substantive law’
and…the substantive law the Act created [is] applicable in state and federal
courts.”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 25 (1983)).
28
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101,
123 (2002).
29
30

Id.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine - (and what does it mean
for the contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
245, 247–48 (2008).
32
Under Erie, “a federal court has an obligation to apply state law in the
same fashion that a state court would. … Erie represents a broad principle of
federal-state relations within our system of federalism.” John D. Echeverria, Is
Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579, 616–17
(2010). “While Erie put state and federal courts on equal footing when it came to
31
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pervasive importance,33 and Erie posed a strong challenge to interpreting the FAA to apply only in federal courts. As I wrote over
twenty years ago:
“When it was enacted in 1925, the FAA was a procedural statute applicable only in federal courts.” During the following decades, there was “universal recognition that the FAA had nothing to do with
proceedings in state courts.” This changed when the
Supreme Court considered the effects of its landmark
decisions in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York34. Erie held that federal courts lack
power to create substantive law, so they must decide
cases according to state substantive law and federal
procedural law. Erie thus required a line between
“substance” and “procedure.” Guaranty Trust provided such a line; it put on the substantive side any
law that was “outcome determinative.” The Supreme
Court used that line in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.
of America35 to conclude that the FAA is substantive
law. Thus Erie, Guaranty Trust and Bernhardt
moved the “FAA from the procedural side of the law,
where Congress had put it in 1925, to the substantive

the substantive elements of the litigants' claims and defenses, the conventional
wisdom is that it did not eliminate disparities with respect to many aspects of
civil procedure.” Steinman, supra note 31, at 248.
33
“Erie’s significance and challenging inscrutability have combined to make
it the Mount Everest of Supreme Court jurisprudence.” Allan Erbsen, Erie's
Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 579, 588 (2013). See also Steinman, supra note 31, at 247-48 (“During its
first seven decades, Erie has achieved a mythic status, and it has been a constant
subject of scholarly debate and analysis. So profound is Erie's mystique that Professor Larry Lessig coined the term ‘Erie-effect’ to describe legal developments
that radically transform prevailing views of institutional authority. Erie's mandate was that federal courts lack the authority to create ‘federal general common
law,’ an authority that the Supreme Court had endorsed nearly a century earlier
in Swift v. Tyson.”).
34
Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
35
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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side, where Congress had most decidedly not put it.”36
Once the FAA became understood as substantive law, a troubling issue arose about the FAA's constitutionality. If the FAA applied only in the federal
courts then the Supreme Court “would have had to
decide if Congress could legislate where Erie had forbidden the federal courts to create common law.”37 In
1967 the Court in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co.38 avoided this difficult issue by concluding,
against the evidence, that Congress had enacted the
FAA pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce. “The Court did not quite say that the FAA
governs in state court, but its reasoning left little room
for any other result.” The Supreme Court eventually
concluded that the FAA governs in state court in the
1980s cases of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., and Southland Corp. v.
Keating.39
To recap, Erie’s fundamental change of the relationship between
federal and state law—a change that far transcends the FAA or any
other statute—may well have made the FAA unconstitutional had
the Supreme Court interpreted the FAA as many argue its drafters
and adopters originally understood it. In contrast, the Court’s different, but still plausible, interpretation of the FAA preserved its
constitutionality.
When a statute admits of more than one plausible interpretation, courts routinely choose the interpretation that preserves the
statute’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court has long followed
36

Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1007–08 (1996) (quoting
IAN MACNEIL, RICHARD SPEIDEL & THOMAS STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW (1994)).
37
Id. (quoting Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The
Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1985)).
38
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
39
Ware, supra note 36 (quoting MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra
note 36, § 10.4.2).
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this “avoidance canon,”40 so it is quite ordinary that the Court, after

40

Hooper v. Cal., 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (quoting Cromwell v. Benson 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) ("When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress.”); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 859 (1989) (“It is the
Court's settled policy, however, to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute
that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation
poses no constitutional question.”); Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395
(2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“The modern canon of avoidance is a doctrine
under which courts construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional doubts,
but this doctrine has its origins in a very different form of the canon. Traditionally, the avoidance canon was not a doctrine under which courts read statutes to
avoid mere constitutional doubts. Instead, it commanded courts, when faced
with two plausible constructions of a statute--one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional--to choose the constitutional reading.”); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S.
142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J. concurring)) (“Justice Holmes made the same point a
century later: ‘[T]he rule is that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our
plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.’”); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
831 (2001) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999)) (“The rule
of ‘constitutional doubt’ holds that ‘where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and
by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the
latter.’ That familiar canon of statutory construction…has been ‘repeatedly affirmed’ to the point that it has achieved rare status as a ‘cardinal principle’ that
‘is beyond debate.’”); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2006) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988)) (“Known colloquially as the avoidance canon, it is most commonly
described as providing that ‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress.’”); Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275 (2016) (“In its original formula-
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Erie, preserved the FAA’s constitutionality by interpreting its
main substantive provision, section 2, to apply in state courts. That
this interpretation of the FAA is at least plausible is supported by
Professor Drahozal who points out that “The language of [FAA]
section 2 broadly makes ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ both
pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements. Nothing in
the language of the section limits its application to cases in the federal courts.”41 By contrast, Drahozal writes, “the remaining sections
of the FAA by their terms apply only in federal court.”42
While Professor Moses similarly traces the FAA’s history
through Erie, Guaranty Trust, Bernhardt, and Prima Paint,43 she
accuses the Court of “disregarding text and legislative history.”44
However, as just noted, the text of the FAA is consistent with the
Court’s conclusion that section 2 of the FAA, but not its other sections, applies in state courts. And while the Court’s interpretation
of the FAA may have disregarded the FAA’s legislative history,
such disregard is consistent with mainstream approaches to statutory interpretation that, for good reasons, tend to give little or no
weight to legislative history.45 So a Supreme Court that disregards

tion—so-called classic avoidance—the canon provides that ‘as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional
and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.’
This means that the reviewing court must first decide that one possible interpretation would make the statute unconstitutional, and only then can it choose a
different interpretation to avoid this problem.”).
41
Drahozal, supra note 28.
42
43

Id.

Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 114-18.
Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 8.
45
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J.
1750, 1763 (2010) (“Constitutionally, textualists argue that statutory ‘purpose’ as
evinced by legislative history [committee reports, floor statements, etc.] is not
permitted to trump enacted text because only enacted text is ‘law’ - that is, only
enacted text goes through the constitutionally prescribed process of bicameralism and presentment. Some textualists also argue that reliance on legislative
history works an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking authority to subportions of Congress [committees], or worse, congressional staffers [who write the
reports]. As a result, strict textualists will not consider legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity.”); John F. Manning, Annual Review of Administrative Law, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1538
44
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legislative history in favor of a textually plausible statutory interpretation that preserves the statute’s constitutionality deserves our
sympathy. The post-Erie Court faced a difficult predicament and
worked through it pretty well—certainly better than the alternative of holding that Erie had rendered the FAA unconstitutional.
Along these lines, Margaret Moses is not wholly critical of
the Court, which she says, “reached a pragmatic result.”46 In this
regard, the Court’s Prima Paint decision was key because its holding that Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its Commerce
power presaged Southland’s holding that the FAA preempts state
law.47 Professor Moses writes that Prima Paint “may appear to be
a good example of dynamic statutory interpretation,” which is the
view that “a judge may legitimately interpret a statute in a way
that goes beyond-or even against-the original purpose or intent if
justified by changes in current circumstances or mores.”48 Moses
rightly says “the Prima Paint Court appears to have adapted the
FAA to a change in circumstances-the sea change brought about
(2014) (“The Court now works hard to ascertain whether the text is clear, exhausting semantic resources before turning to legislative history. Perhaps most
importantly, if the Court finds the statutory text to be clear, that is the end of the
matter; legislative intent, as revealed by the legislative history, can no longer
trump the unambiguous import of the statutory text. As the Court has written,
‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'’”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (“statutory text and structure, as opposed to legislative history and intent (actual or imputed), supply the proper foundation for
meaning.”) See also Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Constitution gives legal effect to the “Laws” Congress enacts, Art. VI, cl. 2, not the
objectives its Members aimed to achieve in voting for them. (Citation omitted).
If § 3730(e)(4)(A)'s text includes state and local administrative reports and audits,
as the Court correctly concludes it does, then it is utterly irrelevant whether the
Members of Congress intended otherwise. Anyway, it is utterly impossible to
discern what the Members of Congress intended except to the extent that intent
is manifested in the only remnant of “history” that bears the unanimous endorsement of the majority in each House: the text of the enrolled bill that became
law.”).
46
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 121.
47
See supra notes 37-39.
48
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 121.
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by Erie and Guaranty Trust-and interpreted the statute in a way
that preserved the intent of the enacting Congress to apply the statute in federal court in diversity cases.”49
II. FAA SECTION 2’S APPLICATION TO CONSUMERS

A. Statutory Text Trumps Legislative History
The previous section reviews the Supreme Court’s Erie-related, constitutionality-preserving interpretation of FAA section 2
as substantive federal law preempting inconsistent state law. Section 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
49

Id. After Guaranty Trust and Bernhardt, the Supreme Court applied Erie
in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), and Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 27 (1988). Professor Moses writes that only the latter of these cases, decided long after Prima Paint and even after Southland, might have led to a different result in Prima Paint had it by then replaced Guaranty Trust; Margaret
L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created A Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99,
117–18 (2006) (“Language in Erie suggested that the Article III power to control
federal courts did not give Congress the right to create rules which affected substantive areas of state law. It was only in Ricoh that those concerns were resolved
in favor of congressional power. Thus, as the courts in Bernhardt and its progeny
viewed Erie, for the FAA to apply in a diversity case, the statute must have been
based on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.”) See also Leslie M.
Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 81–82 (1998) (quoting 19 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d §
4505 (2d ed. 1996)) (“Together, the Bernhardt and Prima Paint cases imply that
there may be some matters that, although they are ‘rationally capable of classification as procedural’ within the meaning of Hanna, nevertheless are so substantive that Congress cannot displace state law in the area other than through
an exercise of Article I powers.”).
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transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.50
Despite the breadth of FAA section 2’s language, “transaction involving commerce,” Professor Moses (like several others51) argues:
“Neither the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Congress that adopted it intended it to cover consumers or workers. …
The FAA was simply intended to provide a means for resolving
disputes among commercial entities.”52 However, the text of FAA
section 2 did not make enforceable only arbitration agreements between “commercial entities” or “merchants” or “businesses.” It

50

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act As Procedural Reform, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1973 (2014) (FAA intended “to simplify business disputing
procedure and to improve the administration of justice.”); Christopher R. Leslie,
The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 308 (2015) (Congress “intended
the FAA to allow enforcement only of arbitration agreements between merchants. Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to consumer contracts.”); Jean
R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 729–30
(2001) (“the Federal Arbitration Act was never intended to permit companies to
impose arbitration on unknowing consumers and employees, but rather was
merely intended to allow two sophisticated businesses to enter into predispute
arbitration agreements.”); Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 118 (2016) (the
FAA “was enacted to cover privately-negotiated arbitration agreements between
merchants…the Supreme Court has expanded the statute to…compel arbitration of…consumer disputes…”) See also Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunc51

tions and No-Modification Terms: Challenging “Anti-Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, at 469 (2015) (the “Supreme Court
has been on a bit of a pro-arbitration tear recently, upholding ever-more draconian dispute resolution clauses inserted in standard-form contracts against all
sorts of legal and policy-based challenges”); David Noll, Regulating Arbitration,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 1001-02 (2017) (“Although the Court’s doctrine has repeatedly stressed the benefits of arbitration, that doctrine makes no serious effort
to identify or police arbitration’s costs. … If there are problems with arbitration,
they are not apparent from reading the Court’s majority opinions.”).
52
Moses, How the Supreme Court’s Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 1;
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 111–12 (“The FAA was a
bill of limited scope, intended to apply in disputes between merchants of approximately equal economic strength”).
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made enforceable all arbitration agreements in all sorts of contracts
“involving commerce” between all sorts of parties, except for “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”53
While the FAA’s legislative history reflects concerns about
non-employment adhesion contracts, such as insurance policies,54
these concerns did not find their way into the statute’s text. So, under mainstream approaches to statutory interpretation that, for
good reasons, prioritize statutory text far above legislative history,55 it is enough to say Congress knew how to except types of
parties from FAA section 2 and chose to except some employees
but not any consumers. Consequently, if consumers make arbitration agreements “involving commerce,” then those agreements are
covered by the FAA.56
Accordingly, the Supreme Court applied FAA section 2 to
enforce a consumer’s adhesive arbitration agreement in the 1995

53

9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“‘commerce’, as herein defined, means commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”).
54
See A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce; and A Bill to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or
Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime
Transactions or Commerce Among the States or Territories or With Foreign Nations: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong. 9-11 (1923) (statement of Senator Walsh) (“The trouble about the
matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not
voluntarily [sic] things at all. Take an insurance policy. … You can take that or
you can leave it. … It is the same with a good many contracts of employment.”).
See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (Sen. Walsh “was emphatically assured
by the supporters of the bill that it was not their intention to cover such cases.”).
55
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
56
See discussion infra Section II.D., discussing the argument that applying
FAA section 2 to consumer contracts is inconsistent with the intent of the Congress that enacted it.
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case of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.57 The following
year, in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,58 the Court held that parties relying on state law to oppose enforcement of arbitration agreements were limited to arguments based in general contract law, as
opposed to state laws designed to protect parties from arbitration
clauses in particular. Casarotto involved a Montana statute requiring that notice of an arbitration clause be given on the first page of
a contract.59 The Court held that this Montana statute directly conflicted with FAA section 2’s command that arbitration agreements
be enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract” because the Montana statute
“condition[ed] the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally.”60
This seems to me the best interpretation of FAA section 2’s
language, as a matter of pure statutory interpretation.61 However,
I confess to liking its consequences more than most progressives do.
This difference about the desirability of Casarotto’s consequences
may reflect different beliefs about the facts—what consequences

57

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74, 77 (1995)
(stating that “[a]fter examining the statute's language, background, and structure, we conclude that the word ‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the functional
equivalent of ‘affecting’” and thus “signals an intent to exercise Congress' commerce power to the full.”).
58
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996).
59
Mont. Code Ann. § 27–5–114(4) (1995) (“Notice that a contract is subject
to arbitration…shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of
the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not
be subject to arbitration.”) This language was deleted from the statute in 1997.
60
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
61
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1008–1014 (1996) (“The
Supreme Court correctly held that the Montana statute is preempted by the FAA
because the Montana statute ‘conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally.’ In other words, the Montana statute is preempted because it
creates a ground for the revocation of an arbitration agreement-failure to include
a capitalized, underlined, page-one notice-that does not ‘exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.’ The FAA ‘precludes States from singling out
arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions
be placed upon the same footing as other contracts.’”).
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flow from routine enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements—as I do not share the belief of many progressives that the
most relevant empirical evidence shows such enforcement tends to
harm consumers.62 That topic is discussed next.

B. Consequences of Routine Enforcement of Adhesive
Arbitration Agreements
Professor Moses writes: “There are a number of good studies, books, and articles about the adverse impact of forced arbitration on consumers. They point out that mandatory arbitration
leads to fewer claims brought by consumers, as well as lower recoveries and less deterrence of corporate wrongdoing.”63 In contrast, my writings argue not only that “forced” and “mandatory”
are inaccurate rhetoric for adhesive arbitration agreements,64 but
also that the most relevant empirical data does show that such
agreements tend to have the consequences alleged by Professor
Moses.65 For instance, she cites data collected by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller to suggest that “firms that impose arbi-

62

Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 65-119 (2017).
63
Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 16–
17 (citing Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and
Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POLICY REVIEW 329 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey Miller, Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U.
MICH. J. L REFORM 871, 883-85 (2008); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration”
104 GEORGETOWN L. J. 57 (2015); Margaret Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHT AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); Jean R. Sternlight,

Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting
Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw. L. Rev, 87 (2012); David S. Schwartz,
Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L. J. 239 (2012); David
S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
5, 17 (2004).
64
Ware, supra note 62, at 43-51.
65
Id. at 65-119.
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tration on their customers and employees tend not to put arbitration contracts in their negotiated contracts,”66 from which she concludes “companies prefer litigation when dealing with peers.”67
However, Professor Moses does not cite a (in my view, persuasive,)
reply to Eisenberg and Miller contending that Eisenberg and Miller’s data “likely significantly understates the use of arbitration
clauses in contracts between sophisticated parties” because “Eisenberg and Miller focus on types of contracts that are unlikely to include arbitration clauses [and] either do not consider, or pay little
heed to, the types of contracts that the arbitration literature commonly identifies as likely to include arbitration clauses.”68
Similarly, Professor Moses describes a series of New York
Times articles as “informing the public of the harms of forced arbitration.” In contrast, I do not think those articles even-handedly
portray arbitration, with charges that arbitrators “commonly consider the companies their clients” and “have twisted or outright disregarded the law” to rule favorably towards the companies,69 and
“the rules of arbitration largely favor companies, which can even
steer cases to friendly arbitrators.”70
Following others, Professor Moses cites other nations’ refusal to enforce adhesive arbitration agreements as support for her
66

Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 18
(citing Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Sum-

mer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L REFORM 871, 883-85 (2008).
67
Id.
68
Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or
Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 463-64
(2010).
69
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, A Privatization of the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of Justice, N.
Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
When Scripture is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2015, at A1.
70
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-thedeck-of-justice.html?_r=1.
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arguments that the U.S. should do likewise. She writes that U.S.
enforcement of consumers’ adhesive arbitration agreements “has
reduced their access to court systems, which means no right to a
jury trial, no right to a class action,” and other consequences.71
However, the civil jury and class action have long been nearly
unique to the U.S. and barely exist elsewhere,72 so I have written:
Much of what makes civil litigation in the United
States materially different from civil litigation elsewhere in the world can plausibly be traced back to the
jury. By contrast, enforcement of consumer and employment arbitration agreements affects only a few
categories of cases and, within those categories, af-

71

Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 19;
For an earlier similar argument see, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a

Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 839
(2002).
72
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in Comparative Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
865, 867 (2002) (“The United States is the only major nation to make extensive
use of jury trials in civil cases.”) (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:
Challenge and Reform 193-94 n.1 (1996) (referring to the abolition of the civil
jury as ‘a course that the rest of the civilized world took long ago‘); Konrad
Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 267 (1977); Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the EU and
the US, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357 (2002)). See also Justice Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV.
191, 193 (2005) (“Duke Law School professor Neil Vidmar reports that fifty-four
countries currently provide for trial by jury, fifty-three of them in criminal cases
only. The United States is the only country in the world that routinely employs
juries in civil trials.”)(citing Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective On the Common Law Jury, in World Jury Systems 1, 3 (Neil Vidmar
ed., 2000)); Richard J. Peltz-Steele, Wrongs, Rights, and Remedies: A Yankee
Romp in Recent European Tort Law, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 102, 16061 (2016) (“Europe has been slow to develop collective action, and conventional
wisdom states that perceived excesses against enterprise in the U.S. have been
cautionary.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014) (“[U]ntil
fairly recently, the class action device was a uniquely American innovation, resisted (if not rejected) by most foreign legal systems.”).

5.Ware.docx (Do Not Delete)

5/21/18 2:53 PM

2018 A Short Defense of Southland, Casarotto, and Other

323

fects only those cases in which an enforceable arbitration agreement has been formed. The civil jury is a
mountain; enforcement of consumer and employment
arbitration agreements is a molehill. Those who value
uniformity across nations and seek to bring U.S. law
into the international mainstream should be far more
troubled by the civil jury than by enforcement of consumer and employment arbitration agreements.
Bringing the United States into the mainstream on the civil jury might even bring it into the
mainstream on arbitration. It may not be a coincidence that the only nation with the civil jury is the
only nation that enforces consumer and employment
arbitration agreements. Eliminating the civil jury
might eliminate the three aforementioned peculiarities of U.S. litigation: costly and intrusive discovery,
theatrical trials, and complex evidence law. While
each of these peculiarities may please U.S. lawyers,
avoiding these peculiarities may be a common reason
why businesses flee U.S. courts for arbitration. After
all, arbitration is generally thought to eliminate costly
and intrusive discovery, theatrical trials, and complex
evidence law. Perhaps eliminating these peculiarities
from U.S. litigation would substantially reduce the
desire of businesses to flee U.S. courts for arbitration.73
Much the same might be said of the class action since businesses’
desire to avoid consumer class actions is widely thought to be one
of the largest factors motivating businesses to put arbitration
clauses in their consumer form contracts.74
Whatever one thinks of the consequences flowing from
widespread enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements, all
can agree that Casarotto contributed greatly to that enforcement

73
74

Ware, supra note 72, at 870–71.
Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing, supra note 62, at 74-82
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and those consequences. While Professor Moses writes that Casarotto means “states are not permitted to protect their citizens from
perceived abuses arising from a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ arbitration requirement,”75 Casarotto permits states to do exactly that if they do
so by using unconscionability and other contract-law doctrines in
ways that do not discriminate against arbitration clauses compared
to other contract clauses.76 However, contract law generally enforces most terms of adhesion contracts, so it is unsurprising that
contract-law-based challenges to adhesive arbitration agreements
often lose and, since Casarotto, courts have routinely enforced
countless arbitration clauses in a wide variety of consumers’ adhesion contracts.77

75

Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 156 (citing Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)).
76
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682 (“Generally applicable contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening § 2, but courts may not invalidate arbitration
agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”) (citing
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)). See also
STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW §
25 (2017) (citing cases holding arbitration agreements unconscionable and discussing FAA’s constraint on breadth of unconscionability doctrine as applied to
arbitration agreements).
77
Amanda R. James, Because Arbitration Can be Beneficial, It Should

Never Have to be Mandatory: Making a Case Against Compelled Arbitration
Based Upon Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Consumer and Employee
Adhesion Contracts, 62 LOY. L. REV. 531, 541 (2016) (“[A]dhesion contracts with
an arbitration clause may pose unique problems for the weaker party, because
they are routinely upheld by courts.”); Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration

Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection and the Circumvention
of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1991, 1219 (2001) (“Courts often resolve the issue of enforceability of arbitration clauses in adhesion contract in favor of the corporation.”) See also Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?:

What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 802 (2014) (identifying “quite a bit of variety in how state courts view the unconscionability doctrine in general, as well as how they apply the doctrine to both arbitration and
non-arbitration provisions”).
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C. Concepcion and Class Actions
The significance of routine enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements further increased in 2011 when the Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion78 significantly weakened one
of consumers’ most powerful threats to business defendants, the
class action. Concepcion enforced an adhesive arbitration agreement’s provision requiring individual, rather than class, adjudication.79 Such “class waivers” are unconscionable under California
law if “’found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve
small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money.’”80 The Supreme Court held that even though
this California rule apparently applied both to waivers concerning
class litigation as well as waivers concerning class arbitration,81 the
California rule “interfer[ed] with fundamental attributes of arbitration thus creat[ing] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”82
While Margaret Moses is very critical of Concepcion, I am
78

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (2011).
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336 (“The contract provided for arbitration of all
disputes between the parties but required that claims be brought in the parties'
‘individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported
class or representative proceeding.’”).
80
Id. at 339–340 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100,
1110 (Cal. 2005)).
81
Id. at 341 (“The Concepcions argue that the Discover Bank rule, given its
origins in California's unconscionability doctrine and California's policy against
exculpation, is a ground that ‘exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract’ under FAA § 2. Moreover, they argue that even if we construe the Discover Bank rule as a prohibition on collective-action waivers rather than simply
an application of unconscionability, the rule would still be applicable to all dispute-resolution contracts, since California prohibits waivers of class litigation as
well.”); Id. at 341–42 (“But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine
normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here,
unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration…because such a rule applies the general principle of unconscionability
or public-policy disapproval of exculpatory agreements, it is applicable to “any”
contract and thus preserved by § 2 of the FAA.”).
82
Id. at 341, 344.
79
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less critical of it. Professor Moses characterizes Concepcion as an
unprincipled exception to Casarotto, which she says:
Gives the Supreme Court a basis for intruding on a
core state law function (such as contract law) any time
a provision appears to limit the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement, if contracts generally are not
limited in the same way. However, when it suits, the
Court has ignored this rule, in favor of striking a limitation on arbitration even though the same limitation
is also applied to litigated matters, as we see in a class
action waiver case decided by the Court in 2011–
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception.83
In contrast, I believe “Concepcion correctly interprets FAA § 2's
use of the word ‘arbitration’ to make § 2 more than just a prohibition against discriminating against arbitration agreements.”84
“Arbitration” is widely understood to mean a form of
binding adjudication that is not litigation. However,
if a state could hold unconscionable any agreement
for binding adjudication that does not use the same
procedural and evidentiary rules as litigation and the
same trier of fact (jury) as litigation, then the so-called
“arbitration” left enforceable in that state would be
too close to litigation to qualify as “arbitration” as that
term is used in FAA § 2. The only significant difference between this so-called “arbitration” and litigation would be that the parties would select and pay
for the “judge” conducting the jury trial under the
same rules of procedure and evidence that a governmentally selected and paid judge in litigation would
use. So § 2 must be interpreted to prevent states from
holding unconscionable agreements to use a form of
binding adjudication that differs from litigation more
83

Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction, supra note 16, at 12.
Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration
Law, supra note 9, at 1277–78.
84
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profoundly than merely selecting and paying for the
judge.
How much more profoundly? A form of binding adjudication that significantly differs from litigation by having (1) less discovery, (2) fewer evidentiary
rules, and (3) no jury should be different enough to
qualify as “arbitration,” and thus immune from characterization as per se unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. Concepcion's interpretation of FAA § 2
adds a fourth difference required to be different
enough to qualify as “arbitration”: (4) no class actions.
...[T]his conclusion of Concepcion is plausible as an
interpretation of the FAA, but, as a matter of policy,
I think the enforceability of arbitral class waivers
ought to conform to non-arbitration law on class
waivers.85
In other words, while my policy preference would treat arbitral
class waivers like non-arbitral class waivers, I believe Concepcion’s legal analysis is at least plausible.
In sum, Casarotto and Concepcion have their critics and defenders, but all can agree these two cases importantly affect many
consumer disputes and these effects would not occur but for FAA
section 2’s language reaching consumer transactions “involving
commerce.”

D. The Post-FAA Expansion of the Commerce Clause
When the FAA was enacted, “very few” consumer transactions “would have involved interstate commerce and thus fallen
under the jurisdiction of the FAA.”86 The vast increase in consumer
transactions now held to involve commerce under the FAA reflects
not only an increase in long-distance consumer transactions, but
also the Supreme Court's expansion of the U.S. Constitution’s
85
86

Id.

Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 637, 647 (1996).
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Commerce Clause87 to cover transactions previously considered intra-state and thus beyond the reach of federal legislation.88 So, if
applying FAA section 2 to consumer contracts is inconsistent with
the intent of the Congress that enacted it, that inconsistency is more
properly blamed on the Court's post-FAA broadening of the Commerce Clause than on the Court's interpretation of the FAA.89
The key moment in the Court’s post-FAA broadening of the
Commerce Clause was 1937 when, during the Great Depression,
the Court abandoned original understanding of the Constitution to
permit what would otherwise have been unconstitutional—the
New Deal. In 1935 and 1936, the Court struck down several key
pieces of New Deal legislation.90 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought “a recalcitrant Court was preventing the country from
achieving necessary recovery and reform,”91 and he “chastise[d] the
Justices for their ‘horse and buggy interpretation’ of the Commerce
Clause.”92 After his landslide 1936 reelection, Roosevelt announced
in February 1937 his plan to enlarge the Court's membership from
nine to fifteen, which would have allowed him to appoint enough
justices to reverse the Court’s recent decisions, and thus uphold the
New Deal.93 “[T]he 1936 elections had given the Democrats dominant supermajorities in both the House and the Senate,” which
gave Roosevelt “good reason to hope” that his “court-packing” bill

87

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”).
88
See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 385, 459 (1992).
89
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other
Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. L.
REV. 167, 180 n.76 (2004) (“If applying the FAA to consumer contracts is inconsistent with the intent of the Congress that enacted it, that inconsistency is more
properly blamed on the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause than on
the Court's interpretation of the FAA.”).
90
Barry Cushman, The Court-Packing Plan as Symptom, Casualty, and
Cause of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2089, 2090 (2013).
91

Id.
Id.
93
Id. at 2093.
92
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would be approved.94 “In April, however, before the bill came to a
vote in Congress, two Supreme Court justices came over to the liberal side and by a narrow majority upheld as constitutional the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act.”95
This “switch in time that saved nine” “provided the basis for
a profound shift from federalism to nationalism [that has] effectively given Congress a police power…to regulate any matter under the guise of the original Commerce Clause.”96 As Professors
Eskridge and Ferejohn explain:
The Court's switch in time averted a constitutional
showdown between the Court and the political system, and between 1937 and 1943 Roosevelt remade
the Court with nine nominees. The immediate agenda
of the New Deal Court was to interpret the Commerce Clause broadly enough to embrace regulatory
legislation with incidental (but demonstrable) effects
on interstate commerce, and with this the coalition
consolidated the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence with unanimous majorities by 1942.97
94
95

Id. at 2094.

Roosevelt announces “court-packing” plan, HISTORY (2010),
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan. See also N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding National Labor Relations Act due to a swing vote by Justice Owen
Roberts); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act
due to a swing vote by Justice Owen Roberts); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn,
Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 70 (2010) (“The
prevailing popular…account of the ‘switch in time that saved nine’ begins with
a Court of four stalwart conservatives who battled with three liberal ‘musketeers’ for the survival of the New Deal. Holding the balance were the swing votes
of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, who in the 1934-1935 terms sided
with the four conservatives to successively demolish New Deal infrastructure.
When Roosevelt unveiled the court-packing plan, the story has it, the Court--or
more specifically Justice Roberts—caved. … Thus, in a somersault of constitutional history, the switch in time resurrected the New Deal and spared the Court
from packing.”) Id. at 72 (“Roberts shifted sharply (and statistically significantly)
to the left in the 1936 term” which includes the 1937 cases listed above).
96
Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A
Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 163 (1998).
97
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause:
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In sum, “The New Deal inverted the basic orientation of Commerce Clause doctrine. As of 1932, it was still possible to say that
the Commerce Clause was one of several limited and enumerated
federal regulatory powers. A decade later it seemed fairer to say
that the Commerce Clause gave the federal government unlimited
and general powers.”98
The previous paragraph explained that much of the New
Deal—perhaps the nation’s most important progressive economic
legislation—would have been unconstitutional had the 1937-Era
Court adhered to the narrower understanding of (interstate) commerce prevalent during the FAA’s 1925 enactment. The same can
likely be said of—perhaps the nation’s most important progressive
social legislation—the Civil Rights Act of 1964,99 including Title
A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAN. L. REV. 1355 (2007).
98
Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive
Political Theory and the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 403, 425 (2002). See also Steven A. Delchin, Viewing the
Constitutionality of the Access Act Through the Lens of Federalism, 47 CASE W.
RES. 553, 567 (1997) (“During the early years of the Great Depression the Court
was still clinging to a restrictive view of commerce power. Yet the dam holding
back federal power…broke under the weight of a true constitutional revolution
brought on by the New Deal. … The later New Deal cases confirmed the near
evisceration of any substantive limits on Congress' Commerce Clause power.”);
Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why Progressives Might be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301,
309-10 (2006) (“A massive about-face occurred in 1937, substantially changing
the purpose and use of the Commerce Clause. In response to the New Deal, the
Court redefined Congress's power to regulate some commerce that began with
intrastate activity. … This…opened the door to a line of cases that gradually
increased Congress's power under the Commerce Clause until it appeared to be
plenary.”).
99
Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the
New Deal Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 35-37 (2012) (“A Court
bound by a limiting principle that prohibited congressional regulation of wholly
intrastate activities that did not have a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce, would not have found the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional.”);
Id. (“but for the substantial effects doctrine of the New Deal Commerce Clause,
the effort [to prohibit eradicate private segregation] would have been unsuccessful.”); Id. (describing Court’s holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was constitutional as “nothing left with which to do the right thing other than to manipulate the Constitution through the Commerce Clause. … The manipulation took
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VII prohibiting employment discrimination,100 and of important
federal consumer protection statutes.101 In other words, many employment and consumer claims would not exist but for the same

place and the theoretical underpinnings for it came straight out of the New
Deal.”); See also 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 1:19 (3d ed.
2017) (“Beginning in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., however, the epoch of the ‘modern’ Commerce Clause began, resulting in a series of
cases that seemed to virtually eliminate any meaningful restraints on the power
of Congress to use the Commerce Clause as a device for sweeping federal criminal, civil rights, social, and welfare legislation. For the purposes of federal civil
rights laws, of course, this expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause received its most important application in the cases that upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”) (citing U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, (1941);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
100
Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights: Multiracial Resistance and Reconstruction, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 550 (2001) (“Title VII is a
key provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the most important federal
legislation outlawing employment discrimination.”); Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 307, 359 (“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [was passed by Congress] on the basis of its Commerce Clause powers.”); Melissa Hart, Conflating

Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court’s ‘Strict Scrutiny’
of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1091, 1094-95 (2001) (“Federal laws prohibiting discrimination in employment have generally been passed under both the Commerce Clause and section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the moment, it remains well-settled that
Congress can pass these laws pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority.”).
101
Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 378 (1973)
(The Truth in Lending Act “is within the power granted to Congress under the
Commerce Clause. It is not a function of the courts to speculate as to whether
the statute is unwise or whether the evils sought to be remedied could better have
been regulated in some other manner.”). Stephen Lamson, The Impact of the

Federal Arbitration Act and the McCarran-Ferguson Act on Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 19 CONN. L. REV. 241, 261 (1987) (“Congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, however, clearly extends to essentially local transactions,
including contracts between residents of the same state. An example of the exercise of such power is the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Act has been upheld as
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, and has been applied
to a wide variety of creditors in essentially local transactions, including automobile dealers, home repair companies and sellers of real estate.”); Arthur B. Mark,
III, Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship since Lopez: A Survey, 32 CAP.
U. L. REV. 671, 679-81 (2004) (“The final case in the New Deal trilogy is Wickard
v. Filburn. In Wickard, the Court approved Congress's use of a virtually unlim-
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post-FAA expansion of “commerce” that enables FAA section 2 to
enforce agreements to arbitrate those claims.
In sum, the Court’s broadening of “commerce” since 1937
gave un-originalist breadth to countless areas of federal law, usually toward progressive ends. The un-originalist breadth of FAA
section 2 is a rare conservative (contract-enforcing) consequence of
this broadening. So, asking courts to turn back the clock to a narrow, pre-1937 understanding of “commerce” for the FAA, but not
for the many other areas of broadened federal law, smacks of result-oriented inconsistency discriminating in favor of progressive
statutes and against conservative statutes.
III. FAA’S § 1’S EMPLOYMENT EXCLUSION
The previous sections defended the Court’s application of
FAA section 2 to consumer transactions “involving commerce,” as
both (1) supported by the statutory text, and (2) implied by—or at
least a by-product of—the Court’s post-FAA broadening of “commerce.” In contrast, the Court’s application of the FAA to most
employment arbitration agreements is less clearly supported by
statutory text and post-FAA broadening of “commerce.”
FAA section 1 says “nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”102 The Supreme Court’s 2001 Circuit City decision inter-

ited power under the Commerce Clause over intrastate activity. … Once Wickard established the aggregation doctrine, there were no effective limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Court approved federal reach
into a range of intrastate activities. … Later, in Perez v. United States, the Court
approved federal prohibition of loan sharking or “extortionate credit transactions” even while acknowledging that the conduct was “purely intrastate.” The
conduct at issue in Perez was a loan of approximately $3,000 and extortion involving threats against the debtor and his family for non-payment or payment
in insufficient amounts. Emphasizing Congress's findings that extortionate loan
transactions “tie-in” to interstate commerce and that loan-sharking was a nationwide problem, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act.”).
102
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“‘commerce’, as herein defined, means commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
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prets this provision to exclude from the FAA’s scope only the employment arbitration agreements of transportation workers, like
seamen and railroad employees, but not of other employees.103
Lower courts have followed this interpretation,104 which produces
what I have described as the “strange result of a federal statute
governing employees less closely connected to interstate commerce,
while state law governs employees most closely connected to it.”105
This strange result could have been avoided by emphasizing
that section 1 excludes from the FAA’s coverage, not only “seamen”
and “railroad employees,” but also “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” and then interpreting
“workers engaged in ... commerce” flexibly to broaden along with
the Court’s broadening of “commerce” in post-FAA constitutional
decisions.106 Under this statutory interpretation, as the types of jobs
in “commerce” expanded to bring employees under FAA section 2,
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”).
103
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
104
Compare, e.g., Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351–52 (8th
Cir. 2005) (customer service representative for interstate trucking company, who
fielded calls from customers regarding their shipment orders, was not a transportation worker and thus was governed by FAA); Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,
398 F. 3d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2005) (an account manager who as part of his
job duties transports merchandise across the Georgia/Alabama border was not
a transportation worker), with Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588,
593 (3d Cir. 2004) (employee was a “transportation worker” because “she was
responsible for ‘monitoring and improving the performance of drivers under
[her] supervision to insure [sic] timely and efficient delivery of packages.’ Such
direct supervision of package shipments makes Palcko’s work “so closely related
[to interstate and foreign commerce] as to be in practical effect part of it.”); In re
Villanueva, 311 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (FAA inapplicable to truck
driver).
105
WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 76, at 178 n.9 (citing Richard A. Epstein,
Fidelity Without Translation, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 21, 27–29 (1997)). The statement
in the text refers to law governing employment arbitration as opposed to labor
arbitration. That distinction is discussed in WARE & LEVINSON, at 176-82. Many
transportation workers are governed by federal labor arbitration law. Id. at 304.
106
See supra text at notes 99-102.
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the types of employees excluded from the FAA by section 1 would
have similarly expanded, thus leaving most employment arbitration agreements excluded from the FAA. This interpretation of section 1 was advocated, before Circuit City, by Matthew Finkin, who
wrote: “As the commerce power has been expanded by the United
States Supreme Court, the [FAA section 1 employment] exemption
has expanded along with it, leaving the status of these employees’
contracts in practical effect just as they were when the Act was
passed.”107
While this interpretation has much appeal, Circuit City’s
counter-argument is also coherent. The Circuit City Court distinguished FAA section 2’s “involving commerce”—construed as extending to the full reach of Congress’s Commerce power—from
section 1’s “in commerce”—a term of art the Court has, in several
contexts, construed more narrowly.108 Circuit City said, “the word
‘involving,’ like ‘affecting,’ signals an intent to exercise Congress’
commerce power to the full. Unlike those phrases, however, the
general words ‘in commerce’ and the specific phrase ‘engaged in
commerce’ are understood to have a more limited reach.”109 This
distinction was not fabricated by the Circuit City majority, as the
Court cited non-arbitration cases reading “in commerce” more narrowly than the full reach of Congress’s Commerce power.110
In addition, Circuit City cited non-arbitration cases declining to “afford significance, in construing the meaning of the statutory jurisdictional provisions ‘in commerce’ and ‘engaged in commerce,’ to the circumstance that the statute predated shifts in the
107

Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 282, 298 (1996) (“As the commerce power has been expanded by the United
States Supreme Court, the [FAA section 1 employment] exemption has expanded
along with it, leaving the status of these employees’ contracts in practical effect
just as they were when the Act was passed.”)
108
532 U.S. at 115-19.
109
110

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries,

422 U.S. 271, 279–280 (1975) (phrase “engaged in commerce” is “a term of art,
indicating a limited assertion of federal jurisdiction”); Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848, 855 (2000) (phrase “used in commerce” “is most sensibly read to mean
active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing,
or past connection to commerce”).
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Court's Commerce Clause cases.”111 Circuit City rejected giving
FAA section 1 “a broader construction than justified by its evident
language simply because it was enacted in 1925 rather than
1938.”112 The Court concluded:
While it is of course possible to speculate that Congress might have chosen a different jurisdictional formulation [in FAA section 1] had it known that the
Court would soon embrace a less restrictive reading
of the Commerce Clause, the text of § 1 precludes interpreting the exclusion provision to defeat the language of § 2 as to all employment contracts.
As the conclusion we reach today is directed
by the text of § 1, we need not assess the legislative
history of the exclusion provision.113
However confident one is that Congress would have written FAA
section 1 differently had it anticipated the Court’s 1937 broadening
of “commerce,”114 Circuit City can at least be defended on the
ground that it is consistent with mainstream approaches to statutory interpretation that, for good reasons, prioritize statutory text
over legislative history,115 and with non-arbitration decisions declining to give significance, in construing statutory text, to its enactment before 1937’s constitutional change.116
111

Id. (citing FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); United States
v. American Building Maintenance, 422 U.S. 271, 277–283 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199–202 (1974)).
112
Id. at 118.
113
532 U.S. at 119.
114
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 128 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“no one interested in the enactment of the FAA ever intended or expected that § 2 would apply to employment contracts.”); Norris, supra note 17.
115
See supra note 45. For reasons to consider legislative history, see, e.g.,
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132-33 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116
In contrast, Justice Souter’s dissent in Circuit City would “look beyond
the four corners of the statute” and distinguish the non-arbitration cases as not
“deal[ing] with the question here, whether exemption language is to be read as
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In sum, Circuit City’s strange result has a defensible basis
in statutory text and the Court’s post-FAA broadening of “commerce.” Whether defensible enough to outweigh Professor Finkin’s
argument seems to me a close call.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even the Supreme Court’s current (conservative) interpretation of the FAA still significantly permits contract-law doctrines,
such as unconscionability, to protect consumers and employees
from harsh adhesive arbitration agreements.117 And the centrist interpretation of the FAA I advocate—abolishing the separability
doctrine, increasing judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions on
mandatory law and softening enforcement of class waivers—
would enable contract-law doctrines to protect parties from harsh
adhesive arbitration agreements as fully as they protect parties
from other harsh terms of adhesion contracts.118 But this is not
enough for progressives who want non-contract law to give consumers and employees more protection against harsh adhesive arbitration agreements than contract law does. Some progressives
would make adhesive arbitration agreements harder to enforce
than other adhesive terms by requiring “knowing consent” 119—perhaps the goal of the statute overturned in Casarotto. Other progressives would go even further by prohibiting all adhesive arbitration
agreements.120
Today’s progressives—long accustomed to non-contract
laws protecting consumers and employees from harsh adhesion
contract terms drafted by businesses—understandably oppose dis-

petrified when coverage language is read to grow.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 137 (2001) (Souter, J. dissenting).
117
See, e.g., WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 76, § 25 (citing cases holding
arbitration agreements unconscionable).
118
Ware, supra note 62, at 56-59.
119
Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals
for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 734 (2016) (“the Moderately Progressive
Position would enforce an individual's pre-dispute arbitration agreement if it is
non-adhesive”); id. at n.101 (citing commentators advocating that position).
120
Id. at 733-34.
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placement of these post-1937 laws by a pre-1937 statute, FAA section 2. And they make a strong argument that this displacement
would not occur but for the Supreme Court interpreting that statute more broadly than its drafters and adopters intended. But that
un-originalist breadth is merely a part of a much broader unoriginalist breadth (expansion of the Commerce Clause in and after
1937) that, along with the near-simultaneous Erie decision, fundamentally re-ordered federal/state relations. So, unless progressives
shockingly reverse course by arguing to shrink federal power back
to pre-1937 levels, consistency requires them to seek reduced enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements through legislation,
rather than Supreme Court reversal of Southland, Casarotto, and
related decisions.

